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Abstract 
In response to the challenge of climate change, governments of developing 
countries are evolving adaptation and mitigation programmes for which 
they are seeking international financing. This paper presents the findings of 
a review of national action programmes and other interventions to assess 
their likely societal impacts with an emphasis on land-use change, future 
land acquisitions, population displacement and resettlement. Evidence 
presented suggests there is likely to be additional and large-scale 
resettlement related to adaptation and mitigation investments in the coming 
decades. It describes such climate change-related projects as 
infrastructure development projects and the population displacement they 
may generate as a form of development-created involuntary resettlement. 
The article considers the policy and development challenges such 
involuntary resettlement will pose and assesses the robustness of current 
governance arrangements to manage that resettlement. It is argued that the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change process 
presents opportunities for improving the national and international 
management of land acquisition and resettlement, particularly in least 
developed countries and small island states, but cautions that, at present, 
the financing arrangements do not prioritise the legal protection of affected 
populations. 
Introduction 
This paper reviews national action plans submitted by less developed and developing countries 
as part of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process 
to secure financing for adaptation and mitigation projects. The aim of the review is to assess 
the likely societal impacts of those action plans with a particular emphasis on their implications 
for land-use change requiring land acquisition and population resettlement. It is argued that the 
types of projects proposed mainly envisage new infrastructure and biodiversity protection 
involving what is described as proactive, responsive and planned population resettlement. 
Having reviewed the types of intervention outlined in states’ programmes of action, the paper 
locates such land acquisition and resettlement in the wider context of involuntary resettlement 
arising out of development investments and considers the strengths and weaknesses of the 
current governance of development-created resettlement at the national and international 
levels. It is a finding that adaptation and mitigation plans and programmes of action have the 
potential for relatively large-scale land-use conversions and resettlement. However, insufficient 
information is provided on the location and likely scale of these societal impacts. There is little 
evidence available to suggest that states have considered the magnitude of the additional 
resettlement challenge that such actions will entail, the sufficiency of government laws and 
policies to manage resettlement, or necessary preparation to ensure that resettlement is 
democratic, fair and effective. It further considers opportunities that are presented by the new 
arrangements for climate change funding for building on recent initiatives that have the 
potential to improve the governance of land acquisition and resettlement globally. 
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Adaptation and mitigation planning 
National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) 
The following analysis of probable resettlement outcomes of states’ adaptation and mitigation 
investments is based on a review of key planning and strategy documents produced by states 
from within the UNFCCC and, specifically, Copenhagen Accord processes (transforming the 
Accord into an operational document) and in preparation for COP16 at Cancun. The aim of the 
review is to gather evidence on the implications of governments’ plans in terms of land-use 
change/conversion, population settlement and resettlement, quantify those impacts, and 
assess the policy and legal contexts within which such actions will be undertaken in the near 
future. The review is principally concerned with official adaptation1 and mitigation plans 
prepared by developing countries. 
The World Bank (2009) estimates that hundreds of billions of dollars will be required each year 
for several years to mitigate and adapt to global climate change. There is a complex and 
evolving web of financial support mechanisms to assist developing and transition countries in 
their adaptation and mitigation activities including funds under the UNFCCC, climate specific 
funds under other international agencies, numerous bi- and multilateral assistance channels for 
public-sector flows, philanthropic undertakings and a multitude of private sector financial and 
investment flows. This range of support presents major challenges for coherence, monitoring 
and guaranteeing the implementation of the Copenhagen Accord and subsequent decisions 
and agreements on adaptation currently being made through UNFCCC negotiations. The 
different funding mechanisms require varying degrees of planning comprehensiveness, and 
frequencies of reporting and review (Corfee-Merlot et al., 2009). Potentially, the most 
significant of these funding mechanisms are the Adaptation Fund (AF), which was established 
under the Kyoto Protocol of the UNFCCC to finance concrete adaptation projects and 
programmes in vulnerable developing countries that are party to the protocol, the evolving 
Green Fund and the more immediate US$30 billion Fast Start financing provisions for the 
2010–12 period (see www.faststartfinance.org).  
As the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) (Parry et al., 2009) 
points out, it took 7 years from the launch of the Adaptation Fund in Marrakech in 2001 to 
finally establish an acceptable legal framework for the disbursement of monies. It was during 
the period of the establishment of the Fund, and in the 2 years immediately before and 
following COP15 in Copenhagen, that developing and transition states began to identify in a 
general, and sometimes more concrete, manner projects that addressed adaptation and 
mitigation needs within their borders – transborder thinking on adaptation has been largely at 
the margins of climate change response planning. It is these plans that give some guidance on 
the likely direct and indirect societal impacts of adaptation and mitigation particularly in relation 
to the concerns of this paper – land-use change, settlement and the resettlement or relocation 
of populations as a result of policies pursued under the umbrella of adaptation. 
                                            
1 In its broadest sense, adaptation to climate change includes all adjustments in behaviour or economic structure 
that reduce the vulnerability of society to changes in the climate system (Huq et al., 2003: 19). Such a definition 
would include autonomous or spontaneous adaptations which occur as a reactive response to climatic stimuli, 
without the intervention of a public agency. This paper, however, is principally concerned with planned adaptations 
that may be either reactive or anticipatory, over various timescales, and which are generally undertaken by 
governments on behalf of society. 
WP3 5
While significant funding will be available for actions articulated at Copenhagen, and many of 
the projects identified by governments are likely to go ahead, there remain considerable 
uncertainties about the operationalising of Fast Start and long-term finance, and monitoring, 
reporting and verification (MRV) requirements and processes as the UNFCCC negotiations 
continue. In the absence of a political agreement on particularly sticky issues such as Kyoto II 
agreements, MRVs and the sovereignty question, continuing ALBA2 opposition to the 
Copenhagen Accord and market-based mechanisms, BASIC3 countries’ lukewarm 
endorsement of the process, and disagreements on the issue of globally binding rather than 
domestically binding targets on carbon dioxide emissions, it is unlikely that substantive 
agreements on governance will be reached.  
The clearest public presentation of states’ climate change adaptation planning can be found in 
the National Adaptation Programmes (or Plans) of Action (NAPAs), which were produced by 
more than 40 least developed countries (LDCs)4 between 2006 and 2009 in direct response to 
the Marrakech Report, and the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) established to support 
a work programme to assist governments to carry out the preparation and implementation of 
their NAPAs. It is relevant to note that the NAPA process was designed to assist states in the 
development of strategies that would enable adaptation projects to be funded and launched, 
and as such there was a dual focus among the LDC Expert Group on capacity building within 
states as well as on urgent and immediate adaptation needs. This reflected concerns that 
adaptation to climate change had not yet become a major policy issue or priority within 
developing countries and the ‘mainstreaming’ of adaptation into development planning needed 
to take place as a first step alongside improved national communications on the challenges 
that lay ahead. 
Given these limitations on the NAPA process, and in particular the focus on immediate and 
urgent needs, it is unsurprising that the programmes of action are generally modest in scale, 
undeveloped in policy terms, and cautious in the sense that rather than setting a radical new 
agenda they tend to build on pre-existing programmes of necessary modernisation and 
renovation – for example of coasts, through the development of new agricultural systems (to 
adapt to salination or water shortage), and restoration and rehabilitation through the replanting 
of coastal forests, mangroves and estuarine marsh, or the preservation of sand dunes. In 
addition, there are frequent references to the extension of insurance cover, improved 
management and governance of key sectors, improved disaster response mechanisms and the 
need for improved early-warning systems. It is also noteworthy that the NAPAs were more 
conservative than the general press coverage on risks and threats. For example, the 
governments of those countries deemed most at risk of flooding as a result of sea-level rises 
(Bangladesh, The Maldives) and for whom large-scale displacement and resettlement has 
been widely discussed in the media did not prioritise relocation of populations as an adaptation 
                                            
2 ALBA refers to the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (Spanish: Alianza Bolivariana para los 
Pueblos de Neustra América, or ALBA), an international cooperation organisation based on the idea of social, 
political and economic integration between the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. 
3 The BASIC countries (also Basic countries, or G4) are a bloc of four large developing countries – Brazil, South 
Africa, India and China – formed by an agreement on 28 November 2009. 
4 The least developed countries (LDCs) are a group of 49 countries. They are considered to be the world’s poorest 
countries as they have a per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of under US$900 and very low levels of capital 
and human and technological development. These 49 countries have a combined population of 614 million, which 
is equivalent to just over 10% of the world’s population, but their share of the world’s GDP is less than 1%. 
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response – indeed neither Bhola Island (in the case of Bangladesh and popularly regarded as 
the first example of climate change displacement) nor international resettlement (in the case of 
The Maldives) were mentioned in these countries’ NAPA submissions (or, indeed, in the case 
of The Maldives, in follow-on national strategies). 
For the purposes of this article, the author surveyed 40 NAPAs with the aim of identifying the 
key climate change challenges, the main priorities and project proposals and of drawing out 
and analysing examples of land-use change, settlement and resettlement as a consequence of 
either climatic stimuli or as an outcome of proposed adaptation strategies. 
Countries contemplating land-use changes 
It is generally the case that NAPAs contain statements of intent rather than specific project 
proposals, which mean it is difficult to assess with accuracy the location, scale and societal 
implications of adaptation plans in terms of land-use change. There are, however, some 
exceptions. The government of Eritrea has stated its intention to build a multipurpose large-
scale water development project in Genale–Dawa Basin, while neighbouring Ethiopia is 
proposing a series of named hydropower projects, as is Säo Tomé and Príncipe with the 
construction of hydropower stations in Claudino Faro and Bernardo Faro. The majority of 
NAPAs, however, as Table 1 shows, prefer to state an unspecified commitment to adaptation 
projects that involve land-use change, and only minimal information is provided on the area of 
land or the number of people who may be affected by these projects. 
Table 1: NAPA projects involving land-use change 
Project type Countries 
Coastal reforestation Bangladesh, Cambodia 
Flood protection (sea, lake and 
dykes) 
Bhutan, Burundi, Cambodia, 
Ethiopia, Kiribati, The Maldives, 
Tanzania 
Dams and hydropower Eritrea, Burundi, Lao PDR, Rwanda, Säo Tomé and Príncipe  
Inland reforestation Eritrea, Guinea Bissau, Malawi 
Land reclamation Lesotho 
Source: NAPAs. 
Countries contemplating resettlement 
Evidence gathered from NAPAs broadly suggest that LDCs, when faced with environmental 
and climate change, are in general seeking adaptation solutions that allow populations to 
remain in situ wherever possible. The documents suggest that states have analysed their 
current and immediate situation in terms of numerous interconnected problems: population 
growth, lack of development, poor infrastructure, vulnerability to natural disasters and the 
damage they cause, poverty, overcrowding and loss of natural resources and biodiversity. It 
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has been concluded that these require a comprehensive plan of action within which adaptation 
can be integrated.  
Table 2: Proactive, responsive and planned relocation 
Resettlement/ 
relocation type 
Purpose Countries 
Proactive Relocate vulnerable populations 
(towns, villages and 
communities) from environments 
at risk to safer location 
Bhutan, Mozambique, 
Samoa, Säo Tomé 
and Príncipe , 
Tanzania, Uganda, 
Vanuatu 
Responsive Relocate populations from 
environments that are no longer 
habitable 
Kiribati, Comoros, 
Tuvalu 
Planned 
resettlement 
Resettlement of populations 
displaced by adaptation 
infrastructure and resource 
protection projects 
Burundi, Tanzania, 
The Gambia 
Source: NAPAs. 
As can be seen from Table 2, some low-lying islands, sub-Saharan African states and Bhutan 
were identified as most likely to resettle populations as part of the adaptation solutions either in 
extremis, if land can no longer sustain a population, or in response to identified risks of flooding 
and salination or as a consequence of adaptation projects such as natural resource protection 
and the establishment of wildlife corridors. 
In most national plans specific details about the precise locations from which people are likely 
to be relocated, to where they may be moved, or the numbers of people involved are not 
provided. One exception is Bhutan, which proposes moving the town of Chamkhar to Dekiling, 
and the Comoros government, which estimates that 10% of its population (approximately 
60,000 people) will require moving as a result of saline intrusion into the groundwater and land. 
Kiribati recognises that some relocation may be spontaneous in the event of sudden erosion, 
and The Gambia cites the planned upgrading of the Kotu Stream as requiring land acquisition 
resulting in resettlement. 
Resettlement planning and policy 
As noted above, the guidelines for the preparation of the NAPAs did not require LDCs to 
provide information on the policy and legal frameworks within which adaptation projects would 
be undertaken. There is no detai,l for example, on legal requirements and policy procedures 
guiding land acquisition or voluntary/involuntary resettlement. Across the 40 NAPAs reviewed 
for this paper there are only two references to the process of resettlement. The government of 
Burundi warns that resistance to relocation should be expected, and ‘strong legislation [would 
be] required’. Whereas the government of The Gambia states that ‘resettlement and 
compensation will have to be considered’, the government of Rwanda linked future adaptation 
actions to its recent Imidigudu national human settlement policy for returned displaced people 
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following the violent conflicts in the 1990s. Against the backdrop of concerns voiced about 
coercion, lack of popular participation, poor design and small plot size, the government of 
Rwanda is committed to this form of concentrated villagisation and it may provide the model for 
future environmental resettlement. 
The lack of detail and policy consideration in those sections of the NAPAs raising the likelihood 
of relocation and resettlement suggests that proper consideration has not yet been given to the 
land acquisition and resettlement challenge that will arise were governments to pursue 
resettlement either in a proactive manner (to remove people from areas of risk), in a reactive 
manner (following an emergency or disaster), or as a result of land-use changes or the 
construction of physical infrastructure to aid adaptation. The impoverishment risks, vulnerability 
and human rights issues associated with resettlement have not yet been addressed. 
Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) 
A further dataset that is useful in assessing the likelihood of population relocation and 
resettlement in states’ responses to climate change and in their formulation of funding requests 
are the Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs), recently submitted by non-Annex 1 
parties to the UNFCCC following the Copenhagen Accord. It is generally viewed that the 
process at Copenhagen failed to precisely define what NAMAs should prioritise or how they will 
be included in the emerging international financial architecture for climate change. Similar to 
NAPAs, the NAMAs are mostly generalised and do not set out concrete implementation plans. 
Mitigation is variously understood by the submitting parties and includes projects that were 
previously included in states’ NAPAs or in separate national strategies for climate change 
adaptation and national development. 
For the purposes of this analysis, however, the NAMAs are an important resource because 
they provide some indication of non-LDC states’ thinking and forward planning on future 
actions that have implications for land use, resettlement and migration. Perhaps most 
significant is the commitment to large-scale afforestation (creating new forests) and 
reafforestation (replanting depleted forests). 
Table 3: Afforestation and reafforestation (non-Annex 1 parties, UNFCCC) 
Country Commitment 
Togo Increase forest cover from present 7% to 30% by 2050 
Mauritania Increase forest cover from present 3.2% to 9% by 2050 
China Increase forest production by 40 million hectares and forest stock by 1.3 billion cubic metres by 2020 from 2005 levels 
Source: NAMAs. 
Armenia, Botswana and Jordan each gave a general commitment to reafforestation, while 
Indonesia has signalled a policy of carbon sequestration and Benin a programme of carbon 
storage through new plantations.  
The governments of Ethiopia and Brazil include biofuel development and the increased use of 
biofuels as key mitigation strategies in their 2010 NAMAs with a focus on liquid biofuels 
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(ethanol and biodiesel). According to a UNESCO–UNEP (2009) study, global production of 
liquid biofuels has grown exponentially in recent years, and 2007 production was threefold 
greater than that in 2000, requiring 5–6% of the global harvest of all grains (corn, wheat, rice 
and others), 8% of vegetable oil and 28% of the sugar cane harvest. Production targets for 
biofuels vary by country, but many governments have already adopted goals to replace 10% or 
more of transportation demand for liquid fossil fuels with biofuels within 10–20 years. Meeting 
these goals, the UN report argues, would require a combination of a large increase in the area 
devoted to biofuel crops and an unprecedented increase in the yield of biofuel crops per unit of 
land, water and fertilisers. 
The spread of biofuels has raised concerns in many developing countries about the 
environmental, social and economic impact of biofuel plantations. Sulle and Nelson (2009) 
found in Tanzania that increased biofuel production could involve not only water scarcity, 
deforestation and a distortion of the price of local crops, but also, and most importantly, the 
potential loss of local land rights, land access and the alienation from the land of poor farmers 
in a legal–political context where laws are insufficient to protect villagers and smallholders 
against expropriation. Similar concerns have been expressed in a number of Latin American 
and other African countries.  
BASIC climate change programmes 
Outside of, but also in parallel with, the UNFCCC NAPA and NAMA and Copenhagen Accord 
process, fast-industrialising states (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) have recently 
published national climate change strategies that include plans of action partially cited in 
NAMAs but which also identify, and in some cases attempt to quantify, new priority projects 
and strategic commitments. As Fransen et al. (2009) conclude, these plans articulate the 
potential effects of climate change impacts on livelihood, economies and natural systems, but 
stop short of providing concrete procedures and strategies for meeting adaptation needs. The 
proposals reflect preliminary adaptation planning efforts, but nonetheless provide additional 
important information on likely land conversion, land acquisition and resettlement outcomes 
with important implications. 
Table 4: BASIC proposed adaptation and mitigation interventions with likely 
resettlement impacts 
Country Strategic priorities 
India Improve coastal protection through infrastructure and forest/mangrove 
restoration 
Exploit hydropower potential (large, medium, micro) 
Expand forest cover to one-third of country’s area/additional 
afforestation 
Brazil Increase rail and water transport/mass transit 
Doubling area of forest plantation to 11 million hectares by 2020 
China Promote large-scale, water-saving irrigation 
Expand forest areas and develop biocorridors 
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Country Strategic priorities 
Increase 24 million hectares of grassland  
Speed up water infrastructure including north to south water 
Diversion project 
Source: India (July 2008) National Action Plan on Climate Change; Brazil (December 2008) National Plan on Climate Change; 
China (June 2007) National Climate Change Programme. 
India and China in the UNFCCC negotiations consistently stress the need to avoid 
compromising national economic growth or state sovereignty in addressing the challenge of 
climate change. This is evident in the Chinese government’s Outline 11th Five Year Plan, in 
which it outlines its plans to pursue a twin strategy to balance conservation with exploitation 
and development with low-carbon growth. China’s proposed adaptation and mitigation 
measures, as set out in the draft plan, have the potential to create resettlement on a 
considerable scale. Most notably, the Priority Programmes for Ecological Conservation 
(Chapter 6, Draft Five Year Plan, April 2010) include: 
• the conversion of cultivated land back to grassland or forest; 
• the conversion of grazing land back to grassland; 
• wetland restoration; and 
• the construction of wildlife and natural reserves. 
It should be noted that any resettlement resulting from ecological conservation would be in 
addition to the resettlement being created by development and construction: 
According to the China Land Survey and Planning Institute (CLSPI) from 1993 to 2003 the 
total amount of cultivated land acquired for construction amounted to 1.67 million hectares 
and the number of farmers affected by land acquisition over the same period numbered 
36.4 million with an average of 3.31 million farmers affected annually. The estimate for the 
amount of land required for the period 2001 to 2010 is 1.23 million hectares, affecting 
approximately 26.5 million farmers. 
(McDowell and Morrell, 2010) 
UN Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) 
programme 
The UN REDD/REDD+ adaptation offers finance to mainly forest basin countries to develop 
low-carbon growth, helps countries access financial and technical support to address 
deforestation and forest degradation, and includes methods and tools for measuring and 
monitoring greenhouse gas emissions and forest carbon flows. The UN recognises that REDD 
and REDD+ Programme activities may impact upon the rights and livelihoods of indigenous 
peoples or other forest-dependent communities.  
Indeed, the REDD+ Vietnam Benefit Distribution Study includes resettlement as a possible 
operation linked to ‘interventions that might address drivers of forest change’ (UN-REDD, 2010: 
156). In recognition of the likelihood of resettlement, the UNDP (2009a) has produced guidance 
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that provides background and context on the inclusion of indigenous peoples in UN 
programmes and activities, identifies the guiding principles in order to respect and support the 
rights of indigenous peoples and other forest-dependent communities, and outlines the 
operational guidelines for the design and implementation of UN‐REDD programme activities at 
the global and national scale. While there is no direct reference to resettlement or denial of 
access to forest land in these guidelines, it is likely that interventions and activities are 
implemented to avoid deforestation and forest degradation may include the resettlement of 
communities from those forests, or the denial of access to such resources. It is further 
recognised that the guidelines are insufficient to manage land acquisition and resettlement with 
the expectation that national laws and policies will apply. 
Displacement, involuntary resettlement and impoverishment 
This review of states’ climate change adaptation and mitigation plans and their participation in 
other internationally publically funded, non-governmental or private climate change response 
initiatives, presents evidence in the coming decades of: 
• significant new infrastructure projects (in pursuit of hydropower and water diversion and 
storage, the construction of sea and river defences); 
• biodiversity enlargement and protection (the creation of new forests, grassland and wildlife 
reserves); 
• increased biofuel production; and 
• the proactive and responsive relocation of communities from land under threat of flooding or 
salination. 
There is likely to be additional large-scale displacement and resettlement of populations in the 
developing world taking place alongside other types of state-managed, spontaneous and 
emergency population movements occurring as a result of natural disasters, conflict, state-
planned resettlement as part of natural resource management or land-use change 
programmes, and resulting from compulsory land acquisition for infrastructure development 
projects, industrialisation and economic growth. Furthermore, such involuntary displacement 
and resettlement will unfold in societies where migration, both internally and internationally, and 
in particular rural–urban, will continue to be a significant feature of economic, social and 
political transformations, both spontaneous and state directed, influenced by patterns of 
national and international investment5. 
Such resettlement that will arise as a result of climate change responses will be managed 
within the existing national and international policy and legal frameworks that currently 
determine land acquisition and resettlement policy and practice in both the public and the 
private spheres. Adaptation and mitigation interventions, as the review has shown, are likely to 
be large-scale infrastructure projects. It is therefore instructive to look again at the literature 
and research evidence on development-created population displacement and resettlement to 
consider the strengths and weaknesses of current approaches.  
                                            
5 It is estimated that by 2030 there will be 68 Indian cities with populations above 1 million – 18 more than at 
present (McKinsey Global Institute, 2010). 
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The displacement and involuntary resettlement literature, supported by operational evaluations 
of emergency and longer-term responses by states, international organisations and NGOs, 
points to a strong correlation between the processes of land and resource alienation, 
displacement and resettlement, and the impoverishment and political marginalisation of those 
affected both immediately and over generations (Colson, 1971; Scudder, 1991, 1993; 
McDowell, 1996; Cernea and McDowell, 2000; Kälin, 2005; Ferris, 2008; McDowell and 
Morrell, 2010). In studies that have compared the outcomes of displacement and resettlement 
across and between the displacement domains (where the proximate cause of displacement 
was conflict, a natural disaster, development or a state-mandated relocation scheme) the 
creation of new forms of impoverishment or the deepening of existing forms of impoverishment, 
and the distancing of displaced and resettled people from full participation in society, was a 
marked feature of the displacement–impoverishment nexus (Cernea and McDowell, 2000; 
Ferris, 2008). The largest and most comprehensive body of evidence of this relationship has 
emerged out of studies on development-created forced displacement and resettlement over the 
past 40 years. 
Cernea estimates that more than 15 million people annually in the developing world lose their 
assets and are likely to be involuntarily resettled as a result of land acquisition for infrastructure 
projects in both the public and private spheres. This marks an increase of 5 million people 
displaced each year when compared with World Bank estimates produced in the mid-1990s. A 
large body of research suggests that the majority of those displaced and resettled remain 
impoverished for at least 7–10 years. Without the additional land-use conversions generated by 
climate change responses, the numbers of people displaced by infrastructure development 
projects is set to grow in the coming decades as rates of industrialisation in the south 
accelerate steeply, population numbers climb, urbanisation increases and ever-larger projects 
consume greater areas of land for power, transport, water, commercial agriculture, urban 
upgrading and commercial zones. 
Over the past decade, academic researchers, civil society organisations representing the 
interests of those affected by development, and indeed the development banks who lend 
money for projects that generate development gains – but in so doing create displacement – 
acknowledge the negative impacts of land acquisition, asset loss and involuntary resettlement. 
Specifically, research across Asia, Africa and Latin America has catalogued the multiple 
impoverishment risks generated by failures in involuntary resettlement and the weaknesses in 
the legal and policy frameworks to protect affected populations against both legal and illegal 
displacement and resettlement. Loss of livelihoods and access to lands strip rural populations 
of a secure means of subsistence, affecting family well-being and social cohesion. When dams 
impact on downstream river habitats, millions suffer the loss of access to aquatic resources, 
specifically protein. What was once an important source of nutrition and subsistence not only 
disappears but the costs of replacing such losses in non-monetised or subsistence economies 
become prohibitive. Such losses typically affect several thousand people more than were 
initially displaced by a reservoir’s construction (Scudder, 2006). Strip developments, such as 
new or upgraded highways, displace often the poorest people living on marginal lands, denying 
them access to market and customers, and with uncertain titles to their land will receive little or 
no legal protection in the resettlement and compensation process.  
While economic losses are significant in resettlement, community disarticulation is arguably the 
most complex part of the displacement and reconstruction process. The term is used to refer to 
the tearing apart of social structures, interpersonal ties, and the enveloping social fabric as a 
result of forced resettlement. Cernea and McDowell have described the main elements of 
community disarticulation as the scattering of kinship groups and informal networks of mutual 
help. The unravelling of spatially and culturally based patterns of self-organisation, social 
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interaction and reciprocity represents loss of valuable social capital that compounds the loss of 
both natural and man-made capital (Downing, 1996; Cernea and McDowell, 2000). While these 
components of impoverishment were identified in relation to involuntary resettlement induced 
by planned development processes, evidence suggests that the same risks – though in 
different combinations and with different intensities – will be critical in other domains of forced 
displacement including the infrastructure and biodiversity protection projects prioritised in the 
NAPAs and NAMAs. 
The UN guidelines on internally displaced persons calls for such development displacement 
only to be undertaken for ‘compelling’ public purpose development. However, the line between 
public and private development is increasingly blurred as governments are faced with limited 
public funds to meet the demands of infrastructure development. The establishment of special 
economic zones in India and China has led to continuing conflict as people protest against the 
acquisition of large swathes of land. Even purchase by the private sector is considered risky to 
land-based rural farmers who, once divested of their land-based livelihoods, are left with few 
skills with which to turn cash into sustainable livelihoods. The extent of private engagement in 
adaptation and mitigation is not yet clear, but states are likely to follow the dominant 
development financing model, which is likely to include large-scale public–private 
arrangements including market mechanisms (such mechanisms have been widely discussed 
by the UN Secretary General’s Advisory Group on Climate Finance, but without clear 
consensus). 
New forms of particularly pernicious impoverishment have been identified where political 
disempowerment coupled with marginalisation – both within displaced communities and 
between the displaced and the wider society and the state – is creating new vulnerabilities and 
social unrest. Pieke recently described land acquisition as ‘the most important source of 
discontent and exploitation in rural China at the moment’ (personal communication)6. In India, 
increasing social unrest or the fear of unrest has prompted the government to approve for the 
first time a resettlement and rehabilitation policy, focusing on both public- and private-sector 
investments. The adoption of the policy is a clear indication of the importance of this issue to 
one of the world’s major economies. Governments undertaking additional land acquisition 
involving population resettlement face a considerable challenge in persuading populations that 
the proposed actions and the societal and political costs they entail are justified by the threat of 
climate change; without public support, the risks of unrest will multiply. 
Evidence shows that tribal and indigenous populations, and those urban dwellers unable to 
prove ownership of the lands they occupy or depend upon for subsistence, are particularly 
vulnerable to marginalisation and impoverishment in land and resource alienation. These 
populations have been historically at greater risk of summary eviction in the development 
process. In October 2007, for example, thousands of landless peasants marched to New Delhi 
to protest against the threat posed to their livelihoods by industrial development, special 
economic zones and supermarkets.  
                                            
6 The absence of a land market in China coupled with the absence of legal provision to limit expropriation for 
public purpose development has resulted in farmers losing their land to unscrupulous local governments and 
private developers who work in tandem investing in golf courses, property development and special economic 
zones to name a few. Protests by farmers increase daily as they find their lands being taken away for 
development. 
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Adaptation and mitigation projects will add to the growing and immediate challenge of 
managing the development process while protecting the rights of citizens in situations of 
displacement and land acquisition. This is a challenge currently exacerbated by five main 
drivers: 
• inadequate available unoccupied public land for development purposes; 
• increased forced acquisition of both private and public lands occupied by the landless;  
• the non-availability of alternative land for replacement to ensure that those who lose their 
lands to development are able to regain sustainable livelihoods;  
• increasing private-sector investments with no regulatory oversight by the state; and 
• a rise in public–private investments with state involvement in expropriation, but where 
investments are profit oriented rather than in the public interest. 
It should be acknowledged that there has been a number of important policy developments 
over the past decade to improve the response to development-forced displacement and 
provide more effective safeguards for those most negatively affected7. States, in adopting 
national and regional resettlement policies and laws (e.g. Vietnam, China, India, Sri Lanka, Lao 
PDR), and acknowledging past damage (as the Chinese have recently done in paying 
reparations to some of the 23 million people displaced by dams in that country since 1949), are 
gradually accepting their responsibilities and understand that development and economic 
progress cannot be achieved by disenfranchising and leaving behind populations who, by 
happenstance, live in the path of progress.  
Within the main lenders, most notably the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB), there were strong pressures from staff within those institutions, and also from NGOs on 
the outside, to strengthen their safeguard policies to ensure that development funded in part or 
whole by bank loans did not have the perverse counterdevelopment impacts of increased 
impoverishment, marginalisation of indigenous population and women, and accelerated 
damage to the environment. Consequently, throughout the 1990s there was encouraging 
dialogue between the international financing institutions and lender governments on new 
legislative frameworks within which land acquisition and involuntary resettlement would be 
conducted8. There was encouragement, also, that the banks’ oversight role was being 
strengthened9.  
                                            
7 Professor John Ruggie, the UN Special Representative for Human Rights, Transnational Corporations and other 
Business Enterprises, has recently commissioned a report on human rights, which is being prepared with the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC). 
8 The ADB in particular used its resources to fund technical assistance programmes designed to bring polices and 
laws in line with the best international standards. 
9 For example, the Mumbai Urban Transportation Project (MUTP), funded by the World Bank and which displaced 
some 12,000 people, failed to plan for commercial opportunities for displaced small businesses and was finally 
suspended after the Bank’s board approved the inspection panel’s critical report. The suspension was lifted after 
the approval of a remedial action plan. 
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However, in recent years the development banks would appear to have backtracked from this 
commitment, and initial momentum in improving legislative frameworks has been lost. Despite 
operational improvements in calculating and making reparations for assets lost as a result of 
land acquisition, the record remains bleak and impoverishment remains the dominant outcome 
for the majority displaced from their lands and communities as a result of development 
investments. There are a range of new uncertainties in the coming decades that present even 
greater challenges for policy makers, civil society, academic researchers and the affected 
populations. These include: 
• the fast-evolving shift towards commercial development, for example in highways and energy 
development, the construction of dams for power generation (for example, the Nam Theun 2 
hydropower project in Laos), and the potential development of the Mekong river for serving 
the energy needs of the region;  
• with conflict-related internal displacement on the increase (see IDMC, 2009 Global Report) it 
is more commonly the case that development-forced displacement is intermeshing with 
conflict population displacement – this dynamic has clear protection implications; 
• similarly, disaster-related displacement is on the rise (ICRC World Disasters Report, 2009) 
and again there is a dangerous intersection of types of displacement that raise complex 
response and protection challenges; Bangladesh in particular faces an enormous challenge in 
finding sufficient land for re-establishing displaced people from disaster and development 
projects; and 
• the rise of new investors, such as China in Africa and the Mekong Region, raises potential 
social risks that have not been documented.  
Research continues to show that development displacees in unstable and undemocratic 
countries in conflict are particularly susceptible to human rights violations and multiple 
displacement.  
Conclusion 
It is against this backdrop of the fractured governance of population displacement and 
resettlement and poor performance in the public and private development process that 
additional resettlement resulting from adaptation and mitigation projects will take place. 
Information advanced by states on their national action plans to tackle climate change provide 
insufficient information on the location and likely scale of these societal impacts. Many states 
do not have land acquisition or resettlement legislation that is adequate to guarantee the 
protection of the displaced or to ensure their rehabilitation in a new location. There is little 
evidence to suggest that either donors or the recipient states of climate financing have 
considered the magnitude of the additional resettlement challenge or the sufficiency of 
international and national laws, operational guidelines and policies to manage resettlement in a 
manner that ensures it is lawful, democratic, fair and effective.  
However, despite the disappointment of the Copenhagen Accord and the lack of political will to 
achieve a global binding agreement on climate change through the UNFCC process, there is 
political momentum driven by some states in Europe, the USA and Japan to deliver what is 
called Fast Start financing for adaptation, in the region of US$30 billion initially (possibly rising 
to US$100 billion over the next decade), to further develop and bring into reality developing 
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states’ NAMAs and NAPAs. While there is some debate as to whether Fast Start is additional 
money or has been diverted from existing official development assistance, Fast Start 
concessional loans and grants will most likely be distributed through multilateral channels such 
as the Global Environment Facility (GEF), under the trusteeship of the World Bank, and the 
Climate Investment Fund (CIF), managed by the multilateral development banks, and aimed at 
small island states and least developed countries in Africa.  
Fast Start financing is seen by certain Western states as an important means of rebuilding 
confidence and trust between developed and developing countries in the absence of any clear 
consensus on a more general framework for climate financing. The momentum behind Fast 
Start presents both opportunities and risks for any ambition to use climate change adaptation 
and mitigation processes as leverage to tackle the weaknesses in national and international 
frameworks for managing land acquisition and population resettlement in the development 
context. The main risk is that the evident urgency to deliver financing will mean that projects 
proceed without the full and necessary scrutiny of legal and policy safeguards to protect 
against poor land acquisition and resettlement. The channelling of Fast Start funds through the 
GEF provides both a risk and an opportunity. It has already been noted that the World Bank, in 
part through its country systems approach in which the implementation of bank-financed 
projects rely on borrower governments institutions, laws and policies rather than on the bank’s 
own environmental and social safeguard policies – specifically those on involuntary 
resettlement – signal a retreat on the Bank’s commitment to setting and upholding international 
standards on resettlement and protecting the most vulnerable. Balasundaram and Dobinger 
(2006: 12) acknowledge that the adoption of country systems by the institutional members of 
the GEF has important implications for the projects it funds and ultimately ‘might affect the 
effectiveness of such safeguards’. The high-level ministerial engagement in the Fast Start and 
GEF, which includes the UN Secretary General’s Advisory Group on Climate Finance and 
numerous bilateral talks, represents an opportunity to position the social impacts of any 
decisions taken on climate financing to be at the centre of those discussions. For some years, 
Western governments have shown a reluctance to engage with developing country 
governments at any senior political level on involuntary resettlement; however, the current 
political momentum and the broad nature of the discussions around energy policy, urbanisation 
and biodiversity protection offer an opportunity for such engagement to take place on a 
constructive basis where adaptation and mitigation projects are not standalone but, rather, are 
fully integrated into national development planning and international cooperation. 
In a more practical way, systems of reporting for Fast Start funding have not yet been agreed 
but discussions are taking place within the wider and more difficult negotiations about the 
domestic measurement, reporting and verification (DMRV) of climate change-related actions by 
both developing and developed countries. While the DMRV regime is still being evolved, formal 
reporting to the UNFCC will more than likely continue to take place through National 
Communications (NatComs) with states establishing new institutions for this purpose. The main 
purpose of DMRV is to track progress made by states on carbon emissions reduction and other 
actions, to provide international recognition of that progress and, ultimately, to introduce 
transparency in the use of funds and add credibility to the UNFCC process itself. Beyond 
immediate verification, DMRV is also designed as a mechanism to improve policy and practice 
in all areas of mitigation and adaptation. Overall, the regime is not particularly strong, NatComs 
are sporadic, they are not subject to expert review, and their quality varies greatly depending in 
part on the sufficiency of data and the resources and the capacity within developing states to 
undertake complex evaluations. However, it is argued here that within DMRV there is an 
opportunity to build in the requirement that states in receipt of international funding for projects 
that involve land acquisition and resettlement should provide full and comprehensive reporting 
on resettlement’s legal basis, detail the policies that guide consultation and compensation, and 
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provide evidence of how the resettlement was undertaken and its impact on those affected. It 
might be necessary to draw up new guidelines for international consultation and analysis of 
mitigation and adaptation actions taken that result in displacement and resettlement. 
Finally, in any analysis of green adaptation and mitigation that involve land-use change and 
resettlement it is important to understand those processes within the international and national 
complex of population movements, including historical internal displacement and resettlement. 
Climate change-related displacement and resettlement will not occur in a vacuum but rather 
will be shaped by other types of movement within a country and across borders including 
conflict displacement, migration and return, economic migration, and disaster-related, politically 
motivated and development-induced movements. The complexity of such movements of 
people within states and across borders presents protection challenges of equal complexity 
that will need to be addressed by states and their funders contemplating any new land 
acquisitions or land-use change that will demand population relocation.  
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